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Abstract
This paper studies the long run welfare costs of inﬂation in a micro-founded model with trading
frictions and costly liquidity management. Agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty
regarding trading opportunities in a decentralized goods market and must pay a ﬁxed cost to re-
balance their liquidity holdings in a centralized liquidity market. By endogenizing the
participation decision in the liquidity market, this model endogenizes the responses of velocity,
output, the degree of market segmentation, as well as the distribution of money. We ﬁnd that,
compared to the traditional estimates based on a representative agent model, the welfare costs of
inﬂation are signiﬁcantly smaller due to distributional effects of inﬂation. The welfare cost of
increasing inﬂation from 0% to 10% is 0.62% of income for the U.S. economy and 0.20% of
income for the Canadian economy. Furthermore, the welfare cost is generally non-linear in the
rate of inﬂation, depending on the endogenous responses of the liquidity market participation to
inﬂation and liquidity management costs.
JEL classiﬁcation: E40, E50
Bank classiﬁcation: Inﬂation: costs and beneﬁts
Résumé
Les auteurs étudient les coûts à long terme de l’inﬂation au plan du bien-être dans un modèle avec
fondements microéconomiques où les échanges s’accompagnent de frictions et d’une gestion des
liquidités coûteuse. Les agents sont confrontés à une incertitude idiosyncratique inassurable qui
touche les occasions d’échange sur un marché décentralisé des biens, et ils doivent rééquilibrer
leurs avoirs liquides à coût ﬁxe sur un marché centralisé des liquidités. En conférant un caractère
endogène à la décision des agents de participer au marché des liquidités, les auteurs permettent au
modèle d’endogénéiser les réactions obtenues pour la vitesse de circulation, la production, le
degré de segmentation des marchés et la distribution de la monnaie. Ils constatent que, par rapport
aux estimations conventionnelles des modèles à agent représentatif, les coûts de l’inﬂation sur le
bien-être se trouvent nettement réduits par les effets de répartition de l’inﬂation. Ainsi, la hausse
du taux d’inﬂation de 0 à 10 % se solde, en termes de bien-être, par une perte de revenus de
0,62 % pour l’économie américaine et de 0,20 % pour l’économie canadienne. De plus, la perte
de bien-être n’évolue souvent pas dans les mêmes proportions que le taux d’inﬂation, mais
dépend de l’effet endogène qu’a l’inﬂation sur la participation au marché des liquidités ainsi que
des frais de gestion des liquidités.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E40, E50
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Inﬂation : coûts et avantages1 Introduction
The adoption of formal in°ation targets by Canada and other countries during the last
decades and the generalized move towards lower in°ation by most countries has stimulated a
considerable interest in the welfare gains from price stability. In this paper, we contribute to
this debate by evaluating the long-run welfare costs of in°ation in a micro-founded monetary
model with trading frictions, modeled as uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding
trading opportunities, and costly liquidity management.
The measurement of the welfare costs of in°ation is one of the classic questions in mon-
etary economics and has been addressed in a long line of research starting with the con-
tributions of Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969). In his seminal paper, Bailey proposed
quantifying the welfare cost of in°ation by measuring the \welfare triangle," the area un-
der the money demand curve representing the consumers' surplus that could be gained by
reducing the nominal interest rate from r to zero. In a recent paper, Lucas (2000) surveys
research on the welfare cost of in°ation and provides new estimates for the U.S. economy.
Lucas estimates the welfare gain of going from 10% to 0% in°ation to be slightly below 1
percent of income. The magnitude of the estimate of such costs is not without controversy
and, in particular, depends critically on the interest and transaction sensitivity of the money
demand.1 Given that there are few historical episodes of very low and very high nominal
interest rates for which data is available, the robust estimation of such critical parameters
as the interest elasticity of the money demand becomes particularly challenging. Guidance
from solid micro-founded monetary theory becomes essential to understand how individuals
manage their liquidity. In Lucas' own words, \[...] theory at the level of the models I re-
viewed [...] is not adequate to let us see how people would manage their cash holdings at very
low interest rates. Perhaps for this purpose theories that take us farther on the search for
foundations, such as the matching models introduced by Kiyotaki and Wright, are needed."
1Lucas' estimate is double the estimates of Bailey's and others. The reason for these higher costs is that
Lucas uses a double log schedule for the money demand, as opposed to the semi-log schedule utilized by
Bailey and Friedman, arguing that it provides a better ¯t to twentieth-century U.S. data.
2In this paper we pursue exactly this challenge.
A recent paper by Lagos and Wright (2005) proposes a new framework for monetary and
policy analysis based on a micro-founded search theoretical model of money and provides
new measures of the welfare costs of in°ation. They calibrate their model to match the U.S.
empirical money demand curve and ¯nd a much higher welfare cost than standard estimates.
Their model predicts that going from 10% to 0% in°ation can be worth between 3% and
5% of consumption. The reason for these higher welfare costs are the distortions (hold-
up problems) introduced by the non-competitive pricing mechanism assumed - generalized
Nash-bargaining. In the absence of these distortions, e.g., when buyers get to make take-it-
or-leave-it o®ers to sellers, their estimates are similar to those of Lucas.2
One limitation of the analysis conducted by Lagos-Wright is that, for the sake of an-
alytical tractability, they make restrictive assumptions that eliminate some of the most
interesting features of standard search models of money, features that could have important
implications for the measurement of the welfare costs of in°ation. In particular, in standard
search models uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding trading opportunities, and
thus the timing and amounts of receipts and disbursements of money (an empirically plau-
sible feature), leads to a non-trivial liquidity management problem and, in equilibrium, to
a non-degenerate distribution of money across agents. In such an environment, agents hold
money for both transactions and precautionary motives and an expansionary redistributive
monetary policy can potentially be welfare improving by providing \insurance" against an
agent's idiosyncratic trading history.3 On the other hand, Lagos and Wright allow agents
2In their model agents must make an irreversible decision, while in a centralized market, on how much
money to bring into the bargaining table in the decentralized market. The more money an agents brings
the bigger the surplus of trade to be had at a bilateral meeting. Yet, unless the buyer has all the bargaining
power, he will only get part of that additional surplus. As such, agents will generally bring too little money
into the decentralized market. In°ation, by decreasing the amount of real money balances agents want to
carry in equilibrium, further accentuates this distortion leading to the higher welfare costs of in°ation.
3For example, see Deviatov and Wallace (2001) and Molico (2006). Similar results are found in Levine
(1991), in a distinct environment. In contrast, _ Imrohoro¸ glu (1992) ¯nds that, in an endowment economy
where agents hold money in order to smooth consumption in the face of income variability for which there
is no insurance, the welfare costs of in°ation are signi¯cantly higher than previous estimates since in°ation
hinders the ability of agents to smooth consumption.
3to costlessly re-balance their money holdings without limit by producing and trading \gen-
eral goods" in a centralized market after each round of decentralized trade. By assuming
agents have quasilinear preferences over such goods they e®ectively provide a mechanism
through which agents can perfectly \insure" against their idiosyncratic trading histories. By
construction, this assumption eliminates any redistributive gains from in°ation making it
impossible to determine if these e®ects are quantitatively signi¯cant. As mentioned above,
these assumptions are made for the sake of analytical tractability and not for their empirical
plausibility.
Our paper relaxes these assumptions by considering an environment in which the par-
ticipation in a centralized liquidity market is both costly and endogenous. In particular, we
assume that agents have to pay a ¯xed cost to participate in such a market.4 This assump-
tion is meant to capture the idea that participation in organized trading, intermediation and
¯nancial market is costly. These costs include not only ¯nancial costs of participation but
also time spent in such activities. Moreover, it is motivated by the fact that not all house-
holds actively and frequently participate in these activities, and that the participation rate
depends on the state of the economy (e.g., in°ation and ¯nancial development). Because
of this market participation friction, agents choose to attend the centralized market only
infrequently and to keep an inventory of money for trading in the decentralized market. In
this sense, our model provides micro-foundations for a class of inventory theoretic monetary
models in the tradition of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956).5 In our model, the centralized
market provides only limited \insurance" against idiosyncratic uncertainty. By endogenizing
the decision of participation, this model also endogenizes the responses of velocity, output,
the degree of market segmentation as well as the monetary distribution. We calibrate the
4We interpret this market as a \pure liquidity market" in the sense that we assume agents have linear
preferences over the goods traded in such market. As such, the only reason an agent would participate in
this market would be to re-balance his or her money holdings, given that market participation is costly and
there is no other gains of trade to be had. This market is meant to proxy for a number of markets in the
actual economy in which agents can obtain insurance against liquidity risk, for example, ¯nancial markets.
5For general equilibrium versions of inventory theoretic models of money see, for example, Jovanovic
(1982) and Romer (1986).
4model to match both the U.S. and Canadian empirical money demands and use a numerical
algorithm to study the long-run e®ects of in°ation on welfare for both economies.
The costs and bene¯ts of in°ation in our model are threefold. First, as is common in
most monetary models, in°ation serves as a distortionary tax reducing welfare. Second, in°a-
tion generates deadweight loss associated with the liquidity management activities. Finally,
mildly expansionary redistributive monetary policy can potentially be welfare improving by
relaxing the liquidity constraint of some agents. In this way, in°ation works as an \insurance"
mechanism against an agents's liquidity risk.
Our ¯ndings con¯rm that the consideration of costly liquidity management and distribu-
tional e®ects quantitatively matter for the welfare cost of in°ation. First, we ¯nd that the
welfare cost di®ers signi¯cantly from that of a representative agent model and is not well
captured by the area under the aggregate money demand. In particular, abstracting from
the hold-up problem mentioned above, the welfare cost is generally lower than the traditional
estimates due to the distributional e®ects of in°ation. Namely, for example, we ¯nd that
the welfare gain of reducing in°ation from 10% to 0% to be 0:62% of income for the U.S.
economy and 0:20% of income for the Canadian economy. The corresponding areas under
the aggregate money demand curves (which are approximately equal to the welfare cost in
a representative agent model) are, respectively, 0:85% and 0:34%. It is worthwhile noticing
that the welfare costs of a 10% in°ation for the Canadian economy is one third of that of
the U.S. economy. This ¯nding is consistent with previous estimates of the welfare costs of
in°ation for both economies using a representative agent models and is a re°ection of the
lower interest-elasticity of the Canadian money demand implied by the data. Furthermore,
as is the case for the U.S. economy, our estimate is lower than previous estimates in the
literature.6
Second, the welfare cost is generally non-linear in the rate of in°ation. The welfare
6For example, Serletis and Yavari (2004) redo the estimates of Lucas for the Canadian economy using
recent advances in the ¯eld of econometrics to estimate the interest elasticity of money demand and report
a welfare cost of 0:35% from reducing the nominal interest rate from 14% to 3%, similar to the area under
the demand curve that we estimate.
5cost of small rates of in°ation might be proportionally smaller or larger than that of higher
rates depending on how the participation rate in the liquidity market and associated costs
responds to in°ation. This implies that the welfare costs of 10% in°ation might not be too
informative if one is interested in evaluating the welfare gains of reducing in°ation, say, from
2% to 1%. Moreover, the e®ect of a decrease in the costs of participation in the liquidity
market, say due to ¯nancial development, on the welfare cost of di®erent rates of in°ation
might vary both quantitatively and qualitatively.
This paper is related to other papers in the search-theoretical literature that extend the
Lagos and Wright framework by assuming that agents can trade in the centralized market
only infrequently. Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2005), Ennis (2005), Williamson (2006),
and Telyukova and Wright (2005) study an environment in which agents participate in the
centralized market at an exogenous rate. This paper takes a further step to fully endogenize
the participation in the centralized market because the participation decision should not be
taken as invariant to policy intervention. This paper also generalizes the existing search
literature by developing a framework that nests several existing search models as special
cases. When the ¯xed cost is zero, the model reduces to Lagos and Wright (2005) in which
the Friedman rule is optimal. When the cost is in¯nite, the model reduces to Molico (2006)
in which positive in°ation can be welfare improving. Finally, this paper also contributes to
the literature by integrating an endogenous market segmentation model (focusing on market
participation frictions)7 with a search-theoretic model (focusing on goods trading frictions).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section
3 de¯nes an equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the numerical algorithm used to compute the
stationary equilibria of the model. In section 5, to facilitate the comparison of our results
to the existing literature, we calibrate the model to match the empirical money demand for
the U.S. economy and study the welfare cost of in°ation. In section 6 we redo the exercise
7Models with exogenous market segmentation include Grossman and Weiss (1983), Alvarez and Atkeson
(1997), and Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2003). Models with endogenous market segmentation include
Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), Chiu (2005) and Khan and Thomas (2005). All these models impose
an exogenous cash-in-advance constraint.
6for the Canadian economy. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0;1;2;:::. There are two types of non-storable com-
modities: general and special goods. The economy consists of a continuum [0;1] of agents.
The per-period utility of an agent is given by
U(Xt) ¡ C(Yt) + u(xt) ¡ c(yt);
where U(X) denotes the utility of consuming X units of the general good, C(Y ) denotes the
disutility of producing Y units of the general good, u(x) denotes the utility of consuming x
units of the special good, and c(y) denotes the disutility of producing y units of the special
good. We assume that U(X) = X and C(Y ) = Y .8 Also, we assume that u(¢) is twice
continuously di®erentiable, strictly increasing, concave (with u strictly concave), and satisfy
u(0) = 0 with u0(¹ x) = 1 for some ¹ x > 0. Also, c(y) = y. Agents discount the future at
discount factor ¯ 2 (0;1).
In this economy, there is an additional, perfectly divisible, and costlessly storable object
which cannot be produced or consumed by any private individual, called ¯at money. Agents
can hold any non-negative amount of money ^ m 2 R+. The money stock at the beginning of
period t is denoted Mt. In what follows we express all nominal variables as fractions of the
beginning of the period money supply (before the current period's money transfers which we
will describe below), m ´ ^ m
M. Let ºt : BR+ ! [0;1] denote the probability measure associated
with the money (as a fraction of the beginning of period money supply) distribution at the
8The assumption of linear utility will allow us to interpret the general goods market as a \pure liquidity
market" in the sense that there is no surplus of trade to be had in such market. As will be shown, the
only reason agents participate in that market is to re-balance their money holdings. Under appropriate
assumptions to preclude their circulation in the decentralized market, one could introduce nominal bonds
in this market and interpret the trades as ¯nancial asset trades. In that world, in equilibrium, agents
are indi®erent between using bonds or trading the general good. In Lagos and Wright, U(X) ¡ C(Y ) is
quasi-linear.
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Figure 1: Time line
beginning of period t, where BR+ denotes the Borel subsets of R+.
Each period is divided into two subperiods: day and night. In the day time, there is
a decentralized market for trading special goods. In the night time, there is a centralized
market for trading general goods (see Figure 1).
As in standard search-theoretical models of money, in the decentralized market, agents
are subject to trading frictions modeled as pairwise random matching. To generate the need
for trade, we assume that agents cannot consume their own production of special goods. To
generate the use of money, we assume that the probability of having a double coincidence of
wants meeting is zero and that all trading histories are private information.9 The probability
that an agent consumes something his/her match partner produces is ¾ 2 [0; 1
2]. Similarly,
the probability that an agent produces something that his/her match partner consumes is
¾. Therefore, with a probability 1 ¡ 2¾, trading partners do not want each other's goods.
9For money to be valued it is only required that in some meetings there is no double coincident of wants.
For simplicity, we focus on purely monetary trades and, by assumption, preclude the possibility of barter in
the decentralized market.
8When two individuals meet and one consumes the good the other produces, they bargain
over the amount of output and the amount of money to be traded. Let qt(mb;ms;ºt) ¸ 0
be the amount of output and dt(mb;ms;ºt) ¸ 0 the amount of money determined by the
bargaining process at date t between a buyer with money holdings mb and a seller with
ms, when the probability measure at the beginning of the period is ºt. In particular, the
terms-of-trade are assumed to be determined by take-it-or-leave-it o®ers by the buyers.10
Let !t : BR+ ! [0;1] denote the probability measure over money holdings at the entrance
of the centralized market (after trade in the decentralized market).
At night after the decentralized market closes, there is a Walrasian market for the general
good that opens. Participation in that market is costly. It is assumed that, at the beginning
of each night, each agent i draws a random ¯xed cost ·i
t (in units of the general good).
The cost · is assumed to be i.i.d. across time and agents with uniform distribution over
the support [0; ¹ ·]. Given the individual's realization of the ¯xed cost, an agent must decide
whether or not to participate in the market. Agents take the price of money in terms of
the general good in that market, Át, as given. If an agent chooses not to participate in the
centralized market, he/she consumes zero amount of the general good in autarky. If the
agent decides to participate he/she must decide how much of the general good to consume
and produce, and how much money holdings to carry into the decentralized market the next
day.
Given the environment, the only feasible trades during the day are the exchange of special
goods for money and at night barter in general goods or the exchange of general goods for
money.
The money stock is assumed to grow at a constant growth rate ¹ = Mt
Mt¡1 for all t. Money
growth is accomplished via money transfers at the entrance of the decentralized market.
Given the distribution ºt, an agent with money holdings m receives a monetary transfer at
10More generally, we could consider that the terms of trade were determined by the solution of a generalized
Nash-bargaining problem as in Lagos-Wright. As shown in that paper if the seller has some bargaining power
additional distortions exist that would imply higher welfare costs of in°ation. The same would be true here.
In that sense, we provide a lower bound for the welfare costs of in°ation.
9the beginning of the period t decentralized market, ¿(m;ºt) (as in Lagos-Wright or Molico).11
We assume that the monetary transfers (monetary policy rule) are such that rate of monetary




[m + ¿(m;ºt)] ºt(m)dm: (1)
This concludes the description of the environment. In what follows, we will gradually
build towards the de¯nition of equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium
In this section we de¯ne a recursive equilibrium for this economy. We begin by describing the
individual and aggregate state variables. An individual's state variable consists of his/her
money holdings (as a fraction of the beginning of the period money supply). The aggregate
state variable is, in turn, de¯ned as the current probability measure over money holdings.
Thus, at the beginning of the period an individual's state is described by the pair (m;º),
and at the entrance of the centralized market by (m;!). Agents take as given the law of
motion of the aggregate state variable de¯ned by º0 = Hº(!) and ! = H!(º) which we will
describe in detail below, where prime denotes the future period.12 Also, agents take as given
the price of money in units of the general good in the centralized market, Á, as a function
of the current aggregate state, Á : ¤ ! R+ n f0g, where ¤ denotes the space of probability
measures over BR+.13 Finally, agents take as given the monetary policy rule (transfers)
¿ : R+ £ ¤ ! R.
11In principle, money could also be injected by transfers to participants in the centralized market. This
would generate an additional \limited participation" e®ect by redistributing wealth from non-participants
to participants. We study this case in a separate note.
12Equivalently, de¯ne the law of motion of by º0 = H(º) ´ Hº(H!(º)).
13Note that by restricting Á to be strictly positive, we focus on only monetary equilibrium in which money
has value.
103.1 The Centralized Market
For presentation convenience we begin by describing an agent's problem at the entrance of the
centralized liquidity market. In what follows we describe the value functions of participants
and non-participants in the centralized market, and then step back to examine the entry
decision of an agent after the realization of the ¯xed cost in order to derive the value function
at the entrance of the centralized market.
Consider the expected lifetime utility of an agent that after incurring the ¯xed cost
participates in the centralized market, W 1(m;!), where m is the money balance held by the
agent normalized by the beginning-of-the-period money stock. Given the price of money,








Y ¸ X + Á(!)[m
0¹ ¡ m]
º
0 = Hº(!); (2)
where V (m;º) is the value function for an agent at the beginning of the day with money
balances m when the aggregate state is º.14 Given the individual state m and aggregate
state !, an agent chooses the optimal amounts of the general good consumption (X), the
general good production (Y ), as well as the money holding at the entrance of the next
decentralized market (m0). The linearity of preferences implies that the optimal choice of
(X;Y ) is not unique but this indeterminancy has no implications for the individual money
demand, m0. Given that we intend this market to proxy for a pure liquidity trading market
14In what follows, we will assume that V (¢;!) is a continuous function. By the Theorem of the Maximum,
W1(¢;!) is a continuous function and the set of optimizers is a nonempty, compact-value, and an u.h.c.
correspondence. By the Measurable Selection Theorem, de¯ne m0(m;!) to be a measurable section of such
correspondence.
11(with no value added), we ignore the production and consumption of the general goods in our
measure of aggregate output.15 The budget constraint simply states that the expenditure
on consumption and on net money purchase is no greater than the income from production.
We can show that (see Lagos and Wright for details),
W
1(m;!) = Á(!)m + max
m0 [¡Á(!)m
0¹ + ¯V (m
0;º
0)]:
The expected lifetime utility of an agent not participating in the centralized market with









Non-participants consume and produce nothing and their money balance (as a fraction
of the beginning of the period money supply) declines at the rate of money growth.
We now consider the decision of whether or not to participate in the centralized market.
Consider the case of an agent at the entrance of the centralized market with money holdings
m when the aggregate state is ! and who draws a ¯xed cost ·. The agent will participate
in the centralized market as long as
W
1(m;!) ¡ · > W
0(m;!):
De¯ne ^ ·(m;!) to be the threshold value such that any agent with state (m;!) that draws
a cost · chooses to participate if · < ^ ·(m;!). The threshold function ^ · : R+ £ ¤ ! [0; ¹ ·]
is de¯ned as
^ ·(m;!) = minfmaxf0;W
1(m;!) ¡ W
0(m;!)g; ¹ ·g: (4)
Given this threshold function we can de¯ne the value function for an agent at the entrance
15We also considered the alternative assumption of measuring as part of GDP the minimum amount of
production and trade required for agents to be able to adjust their money holdings to the optimal amount.
This did not change any of our results qualitatively and only a®ected minimally our quantitative results.

















































0(m;!) ¡ m] !(dm) = 0: (6)
Consider a simple example in which V is concave to illustrate how the centralized market
works. Concavity of V implies that W0 is a concave function as shown in Figure 2(a). In this
example, agents with low money holdings will always choose to pay the ¯xed cost to sell the
general good for liquidity in the centralized market. Also, agents with high money holdings
will always choose to pay the ¯xed cost to purchase the general good in the centralized
market. The threshold function is given by the ^ ·(m) curve in Figure 2(b).
3.2 The Decentralized Market
We now consider the bargaining problem of an agent in the decentralized market. Consider
a single coincidence meeting when a buyer holds a money balance mb and a seller holds a
balance ms, after the decentralized market's money injection, when the aggregate state is
º. We assume that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to the seller. That is, he/she
13Figure 2: (a) W0(m;!) and W1(m;!), (b) Threshold Fixed Cost




u(q) + W(mb ¡ d;H!(º)) (7)
subject to
¡q + W(ms + d;H!(º)) = W(ms;H!(º)):
Or, equivalently, by substituting the latter constraint into the objective function,
max
0·d·mb
u[W(ms + d;H!(º)) ¡ W(ms;H!(º))] + W(mb ¡ d;H!(º)):
The buyer makes an o®er to maximize his/her surplus subject to making the seller indi®erent
between trading and not trading. Note that, given that W(¢;H!(º)) is a continuous func-
tion, the objective function of the bargaining problem is continuous. Also, the set d 2 [0;mb]
is non-empty and compact. Thus, by the Theorem of the Maximum and the Measurable
Selection Theorem, the set of optimizers is a non-empty, compact-valued, and u.h.c. corre-
spondence and admits a measurable selection. De¯ne d(mb;ms;º) to be such a selection.
The function q(mb;ms;º) can then be obtained from the seller's participation constraint.
The expected lifetime utility of an agent that enters the period with money balance m
(before the decentralized market money injection) is given by




+ W fm + ¿(m;º) ¡ d[m + ¿(m;º);ms;º];H!(º)gg º(dms): (8)
The ¯rst term is the value for an agent that either is a seller, with probability ¾, and thus
has a zero net surplus from trade, or meets no one, with probability 1 ¡ 2¾. The second
term is the expected value of being a buyer.
153.3 Laws of Motions
Before de¯ning a recursive equilibrium for this economy, we describe the laws of motion
º0 = Hº(!) and ! = H!(º). We begin by describing the evolution of the aggregate state
from the beginning of the centralized market to the beginning of the next decentralized
market, Hº. De¯ne the function ¦ : R+ £ BR+ ! [0;1] to be
¦(m;B;!) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
1 ¡
^ ·(m;!)
¹ · ; if m
¹ 2 B and m0(m;!) = 2 B;
^ ·(m;!)
¹ · ; if m
¹ = 2 B and m0(m;!) 2 B;
1; if m
¹ 2 B and m0(m;!) 2 B;
0; otherwise.
(9)
Given that, for each m, ¦(m;¢;!) is a probability measure on (R+;BR+), and, for each
B 2 BR+, ¦(¢;B;!) is a BR+-measurable function, ¦ is a well de¯ned transition function.
Then, the law of motion Hº(¢) can be de¯ned as
º
0(B) = Hº(!)(B) ´
Z 1
0
¦(m;B;!) !(dm) 8B 2 BR+:
We now describe the evolution of the aggregate state from the beginning of the decen-
tralized market to the beginning of the centralized market. Let T = fbuyer;seller;neitherg
and de¯ne the space (T;T), where T is the ¾-algebra. De¯ne the probability measure
Ã : T ! [0;1], with Ã(buyer) = Ã(seller) = ¾, and Ã(neither) = 1 ¡ 2¾. Then, (T;T;Ã) is
a measure space. De¯ne an event to be a pair e = (t;m), where t 2 T and m 2 R+. Intu-
itively, t denotes an agent's trading status and m the money holdings of his current trading
partner. Let (E;E) be the space of such events, where E = T £ R+ and E = T £ BR+.
Furthermore, let » : E ! [0;1] be the product probability measure. De¯ne the mapping
16°(m;e) : R+ £ E ! R+, where
°(m;e) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
m + ¿(m;º) ¡ d[m + ¿(m;º);¢;H!(º)]; if e = (buyer;¢);
m + ¿(m;º) + d[¢;m + ¿(m;º);H!(º)]; if e = (seller;¢);
m + ¿(m;º); otherwise.
We can now de¯ne P : R+ £ BR+ ! [0;1] to be
P(m;B;º) ´ »(fe 2 Ej°(m;e) 2 Bg):
Again, P is a well de¯ned transition function.16 Then,
!(B) = H!(º)(B) ´
Z 1
0
P(m;B;º) º(dm) 8B 2 BR+
Finally, we can describe the law of motion of the aggregate state over the two markets as
º





¦[¹ m;B;H!(º)] P(m;d¹ m;º)] º(dm) 8B 2 BR+: (10)
3.4 Recursive Equilibrium
We are ¯nally ready to de¯ne a recursive equilibrium for this economy.
De¯nition 1 (Recursive Equilibrium) A recursive equilibrium is a list of:
Pricing function: Á : ¤ ! R+nf0g;
Monetary Policy Function: ¿ : R+ £ ¤ ! R;
Law of motion: H : ¤ ! ¤;
Value functions: V : R+ £ ¤ ! R and W : R+ £ ¤ ! R;
Policy functions: X : R+ £ ¤ ! R+, Y : R+ £ ¤ ! R+, and m0 : R+ £ ¤ ! R+;
Terms of Trade: q : R+ £ R+ £ ¤ ! R+ and d : R+ £ R+ £ ¤ ! R+;
16By construction, for each m, P(m;¢;º) is a probability measure on (R+;BR+). Furthermore, given the
measurability of d(¢;¢;º), P(¢;B;º) is a BR+-measurable function.
17such that:
1. given the pricing function, the monetary policy functions, the law of motion, the terms
of trade, and the policy functions, the value functions satisfy the functional equations (2-5)
and (8);
2. given the value functions, the pricing function, the monetary policy functions, and the
law of motion of the aggregate state, the policy functions solve (2);
3. given the value functions, the terms of trade solve (7);
4. given the terms of trade and the monetary policy functions, the law of motion of the
aggregate state is de¯ned by (10);
5. given the value functions, the monetary policy functions satisfy (1);
6. the centralized market clearing condition, (6), is satis¯ed.
In the remainder of the paper we will only focus on stationary equilibria, where, º = H(º).
4 Numerical Algorithm
In this section we brie°y present the numerical algorithm developed for ¯nding stationary
monetary equilibria of the model and discuss some computational considerations. The basic
strategy of the algorithm is to iterate on a mapping de¯ned by the value function equations
(5) and (8) and the law of motion of the aggregate state given by equation (10). Special care
is taken in keeping track of the distribution of wealth and its composition across iterations. In
particular, we keep track of a large sample of agent's money balance and use non-parametric
density estimation methods. A Fortran 90 version of the code is available from the authors
by request. We begin the algorithm at the entrance of the centralized market.
A brief description of the algorithm follows:
Step 1. Given an initial guess for the distribution of money holding at the entrance of
the centralized market, draw a large sample of agent's money balance.17
17In all the numerical exercises we use a sample of 10,000 agents.
18Step 2. De¯ne a grid on the state space of money holdings and an initial guess for the
value function at the entrance of the decentralized market, V 0(m), by de¯ning the value of
the function at the gridpoints and using interpolation methods to evaluate the function at
any other point.18
Step 3. Given the sample of money holding at the entrance of the centralized market
and the value function at the entrance of the decentralized market, ¯nd the market clearing
price and participation rate by solving the centralized market problem (4) for all agents in
the sample and iterating on Á and f, given an initial guess, until the market clears.
Step 4. Given these, the function W(:) is given by (5) .
Step 5. Given the market clearing price, update the money holding of the agents by
solving their optimization problem. The distribution of money holding at the decentralized
market is estimated using Gaussian kernel non-parametric density estimation methods.19
Step 6. Given the value function W(.) and the distribution of money holdings at the
entrance of the decentralized market, update the value function V (m) by using the mapping
de¯ned by equation (8) to compute its value at the new gridpoints and re-estimating the
interpolant coe±cients.
Step 7. For each individual on the sample, update their money holding by simulating
their meetings to derive the distribution at the entrance of the centralized market.
Repeat steps 3 to 7 until convergence is achieved.
18We use a grid of 30 gridpoints unevenly spread so as to capture well the change in concavity of the value
function. We experimented with increasing the number and location of the gridpoints without signi¯cant
quantitative or qualitative implications for our results. An Akima interpolation method from the IMSL
fortran routines was used to keep track of all functions.
19To deal with the fact that the money holdings choices of the centralized market participants might imply
the existence of mass points in the distribution we introduce a very small perturbation (a ¯nd-a-penny-lose-
a-penny assumption) in their optimal choice to smooth the distribution allowing the usage of the Gaussian
kernel estimation method.
195 Numerical Results: The U.S. Economy
In what follows we use the numerical algorithm presented in the last section to ¯nd and
characterize stationary equilibria of the model. In particular, we characterize the typical
features of a stationary equilibrium of the model and illustrate the e®ects of in°ation.
We adopt the following functional form for the utility of consumption in the decentralized
market:
u(q) =
(q + b)1¡´ ¡ b1¡´
1 ¡ ´
:
Our objective is to parameterize the model in order to match the velocity of money (or
alternatively, the demand for money) implied by the data. Note however that, in the model,
the velocity of money is a®ected by several parameters. In particular, it is a®ected by the
utility function's curvature parameter ´, by the arrival rate ¾, the choice of the length of a
period (or equivalently, ¯), and the fraction of agents that participate in the liquidity market
(and thus on the ¯xed cost). Furthermore, most of these parameters are not observable. In
the absence of other clear targets, the parameters are not perfectly identi¯able from the data.
As such, in the exercises that follow we ¯x some of the parameters. For the exercises below
we set b ' 0 and ´ = 0:99, and thus the utility function is close to log. We de¯ne the length
of a period to be two weeks and set the discount factor to ¯ = 0:9983 implying an annual real
interest rate of 4 percent. Given the length of the period, we choose ¾ and ¹ · such that the
money demand function matches the U.S. historical data of average M1-GDP ratio. These
two parameters allows us to match the average velocity of money and the interest-elasticity
of the money demand implied by the data. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used
and Figure 3 shows the data and the model ¯t.






d(m; ~ m;º) º(dm) º(d~ m):
We begin by characterizing a stationary equilibrium. Figure (4) shows the participation


























Figure 3: Model vs. US Data
21function and money distribution for the case of zero in°ation. The participation function
gives the probability with which an agent, with a given money holdings after trade in the
decentralized market, will participate in the centralized market. First, note that agents
who are poor enough will always choose to participate in the centralized market. Also, for
high enough money holdings the probability will converge to one. Given the assumption
of linear utility in the centralized market, every agent who participates in the centralized
market will choose to bring the same amount of money into the decentralized market. This
feature generates the spikes (mass points) of the distribution. Given that not all agents
will participate in the centralized market in a given period and the randomness in trading
opportunities in the decentralized market, the distribution of money will, in general, be
non-degenerate. The discreteness in the choice of whether or not to participate in the
centralized market will, in general, imply that the value functions will not be concave, which
generates the \wiggles" in the participation function. It is interesting to note that, unlike in
Molico(2006), poor agents will choose to spend all their money in the decentralized market.
This is due to the fact that in the presence of the liquidity market they do not need to self-
insure by keeping some positive money holdings. In general, in our model the willingness
of relatively poor agents to spend money is higher and they will hold less money balances
for precautionary motives. This allows us to match the velocity of money in the data which
was not possible in Molico since in that environment the only way of insuring was to carry
large precautionary money balances. Note also that, for 0% in°ation, agents that re-balance
their portfolios will bring into the decentralized market approximately enough liquidity for
two purchases.
We now consider the e®ects of in°ation on the stationary monetary equilibrium. Table
2 reports the outcome of the stationary equilibrium for annualized in°ation rates of ¡2%,
0%, 2%, 10%, and 20%. With higher in°ation, the price of money in terms of the general
good in the centralized market, in general, goes down. Agents choose to economize on
their money holdings by participating in the liquidity market more frequently, leading to a
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Money Distribution After Decentralized Trade  (0%)
Figure 4: Participation Function and Money Distribution (0% in°ation)
higher participation rate. As a result, the velocity of money rises and the total ¯xed cost of
participation increases.
Figure (5) plots the e®ect of money growth on the participation function and money
distributions. In general, as the money growth rate increases, the participation function
shifts up, and the monetary distribution becomes less heterogenous.
Table 2: E®ects of Expansionary Monetary Policy
Rate of In°ation -2% 0% 1% 2% 10% 20%
Price of Money 3.17 2.33 2.22 2.16 1.34 1.16
Participation Rate 12.21 % 20.97% 21.45% 23.29%% 44.40% 58.09%
Velocity 3.01 4.12 4.30 4.44 7.15 8.14
Total Fixed Cost (% of GDP) 0.13% 0.28% 0.31% 0.37% 0.91% 1.24%
Now we study the welfare e®ect of monetary expansion. We will measure the welfare
cost of in°ation by deriving how much consumption agents would be willing to sacri¯ce to
reduce in°ation to 0%. Using ^ ·¹, q¹, d¹, º¹ and !¹ to denote the functions and distributions
in an equilibrium with in°ation rate ¹ ¡ 1, we can de¯ne the average expected value with



















































Figure 5: Participation and Distribution for Di®erent In°ation Rates














Then the welfare cost of having money growth rate ¹ relative to zero in°ation is given
by 1 ¡ ¢0(¹) where ¢0(¹) solves














Distribution and welfare cost of in°ation
First, to focus on a single number, given the parameter values, we ¯nd that the wel-
fare cost of 10% in°ation is 1 ¡ ¢0(10%) = 0:62% of output, as reported in Table 3. This
number is lower than the estimates of Lucas (around 1%) and Lagos and Wright (1.3%) for
the same pricing mechanism as we use in this paper. In these representative agent mod-
els, the welfare triangle provides an accurate estimate of the true welfare cost. However,
in our model, the welfare triangle over-estimates the welfare cost. The reason is that in
a heterogenous agent model an expansionary money injection by lump sum transfers re-
distributes real money balances from the rich to the poor and decreases the dispersion of
the monetary distribution. This redistribution e®ect may raise the average welfare in the
economy. Since the aggregate money demand curve captures only the average behavior in
an economy, the area under the money demand cannot capture this distributional e®ect of
in°ation. Therefore, even abstracting from the hold-up problem pointed out by Lagos and
Wright, the traditional approach of estimating welfare cost using aggregate money demand
can be misleading. Note however that, in°ation also a®ects the value of money, the terms of
trade and the participation in the centralized market, and thus in equilibrium will, generally,
25be welfare decreasing.
Table 3: Gain from reducing in°ation from 10% to 0%
Model Welfare Triangle
This Model 0.62% 0.85%
Lucas (2000) 1% 1%
Lagos and Wright (2005) 1.3% 1.3%
(No hold-up)
Furthermore, in our model, the welfare cost is non-linear in the size of the in°ation rate,
as illustrated in Figure 6 and Table 4. The welfare cost of a one percent in°ation is 0.03%
which is smaller than one-tenth of the welfare cost of a ten percent in°ation. Similarly, the
welfare cost of a two percent in°ation is smaller than one-¯fth of a ten percent in°ation.
The non-linearity in welfare cost re°ects the non-linear response of participation to in°ation
illustrated in Table 2. For example, a one percent in°ation raises the participation rate by
1.5% and the total ¯xed cost by 0.03%, less than one-tenth of the corresponding numbers
for a ten percent in°ation (which are 23% and 0.63% respectively). In turn, the non-linear
response of participation re°ects the non-linearity of the distributional wealth e®ects of
in°ation. As can be seen from Figure 5, as in°ation increases the heterogeneity across
agents (dispersion of the money distribution) decreases, leading to smaller distributional
wealth e®ects of in°ation. In Lagos and Wright, in the absence of such wealth e®ects, the
welfare cost is linear in the size of in°ation. In Lucas, the welfare cost is concave in the size
of in°ation.
Fixed cost and welfare cost of in°ation
The non-linearity of the welfare cost depends on the size of the ¯xed cost, ·. Table 5
reports the welfare costs and participation rates for two percent and ten percent in°ation for
di®erent values of ¹ ·. First, the participation rate is decreasing in the size of the ¯xed cost
and increasing in the rate of in°ation. Second, the welfare cost of a ten percent in°ation


























Figure 6: In°ation Rate and Welfare Cost
Table 4: Small in°ation less costly in proportional terms





This Model 0.03% 0.09% 0.62% 0.05 0.15
Lucas (2000) 0.12% 0.23% 0.87% 0.14 0.26
Lagos and Wright (2005) 0.13% 0.26% 1.32% 0.10 0.20
(No hold-up)
in the ¯xed cost. The relative size of the welfare costs for di®erent in°ation rates depend
critically on the sensitivity of the participation rate to in°ation. When the ¯xed cost is
relatively small (¹ · = 0:01), the participation rate is high and responds strongly to a two
percent in°ation (from 27% to 39%), leading to a relatively large welfare cost (0.14%). When
the ¯xed cost is relatively large (¹ · = 0:1), the participation rate is low and responds less
strongly to a two percent in°ation (from 7.5% to 9.0%), leading to a relatively small welfare
cost (0.06%). Again, this can be understood by the variation in the strength of the wealth
e®ects. As Figure 7 illustrates for the case of zero in°ation, as the ¯xed cost increases, fewer
agents will participate in the centralized market and consequently the higher the dispersion
of the money distribution. This implies that for a higher ¯xed cost the distributional wealth
e®ects will be stronger for any given rate of in°ation.
27Table 5: Fixed cost and welfare cost of in°ation
¹ Welfare Cost Part. Rate







































ν ( κ = 0.1)
Figure 7: Fixed Cost, Participation Function, and Heterogeneity ( ¹ = 0)
A policy implication is that, as the ¯xed cost decreases overtime (due to ¯nancial devel-
opment, for example), the welfare cost of in°ation will be a®ected. However, the impact on
welfare costs of di®erent in°ation rates can be completely di®erent both quantitatively and
28qualitatively. In these examples, the welfare cost goes down for high in°ation but goes up
for low in°ation. It would be misleading to use the welfare cost of a ten percent in°ation
to extrapolate that of a smaller in°ation. This considerations are particularly important
given that the data suggest there might have been important structural changes to the U.S.
aggregate money demand in recent decades. In particular, because such changes might be
associated with ¯nancial development. Figure 8 illustrates breaks the data points by decade.
As can be seen, the aggregate money demand has become °atter overtime, implying a lower
interest-elasticity of money demand. This implies that the welfare costs of say, 10% in°ation,



















Figure 8: U.S. Money Demand Overtime
6 The Canadian Economy
In this section, we redo the above exercise for the Canadian economy. We pick the parameter



















Figure 9: Model vs. Canadian Data
b = 0:0001, ¹ · = 0:04.20 Figure 9 plots the Canadian time-series data (1933-99) and the
money demand curve implied by the model. The model ¯ts the data points after 1960 better
than those before 1960. This might be due to the revision of the Nominal GDP series starting
in 1961. But we do not discount the possibility that there was structural shifts of the money
demand curve over time. However, for the in°ation region of our interest (that is, interest
rate over four percent), the demand curve implied by the model does ¯t the data well.
Table 6 reports the e®ects of expansionary monetary policy in this economy. The qual-
itative results are similar to those in the previous section: in°ation increases the price of
money, the participation rate, the velocity and the total ¯xed cost. The welfare cost of a
ten percent in°ation is 0.2%. Again, this is lower than the welfare triangle which is 0.34%.
It is worthwhile noticing that the welfare costs of a 10% in°ation for the Canadian economy
is one third of that of the U.S. economy. This ¯nding is consistent with previous estimates
20We use M1 plus bank non-personal notice chequable deposit (post 1968) as the monetary aggregate and
the 90 days T-bill auction average yield as the nominal interest rate. M1 estimates prior to 1953 are taken
from Metcalf, Redish et al. (1998), post 1953 are taken from CANSIM series V372000. Nominal GDP is
obtained from CANSIM series V500633(34-60) and V646937(after 61). The de¯nitions used in the latter
series are not consistent and might explain the di±culty of the model in matching the period pre-1961.
30Table 6: E®ects of Expansionary Monetary Policy
Rate of In°ation 0% 2% 10%
Price of Money 3.62 3.15 2.23
Participation Rate 13% 17% 26%
Velocity 7.25 8.50 11.61
Total Fixed Cost (% of GDP) 0.12% 0.17% 0.32%
Welfare Cost (% of C) 0% 0.08% 0.20%
Welfare Triangle 0% 0.05% 0.34%
of the welfare costs of in°ation for both economies using a representative agent models and
is a re°ection of the lower interest-elasticity of the Canadian money demand implied by the
data. If one takes into account the recent possible structural changes to the U.S. aggregate
money demand such di®erence might decrease or vanish. Also, the welfare cost is a non-
linear function of the in°ation rate. In this case, the welfare cost of a two percent in°ation
is larger than one-¯fth of a ten percent in°ation.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper develops a micro-founded model to study the e®ect of in°ation on distribution
and welfare. By modeling in°ation and liquidity market working as alternative insurance
mechanisms, this paper illustrates the following ¯ndings.
First, distributional e®ects matter for the welfare. Even without the hold-up problem,
measuring welfare cost by aggregate demand function can be misleading. This ¯nding sug-
gests that, knowing the aggregate money demand curve is not su±cient, we need to have the
information on the distribution to have an accurate estimate of the welfare e®ects of in°a-
tion. Second, the welfare e®ect of in°ation is nonlinear in the in°ation rate. Measuring the
welfare cost of in°ation by extrapolating high in°ation data to unobservable low in°ation re-
gion can be misleading. Third, the welfare cost of in°ation depends on the participation cost
of liquidity market. Financial development can a®ect the welfare cost of di®erent in°ation
rates di®erently.
31In terms of policy implications for Canada, our ¯ndings suggest that the welfare cost
of low in°ation (e.g., 2%) is relatively small. If transition costs are non-trivial, then there
might be no welfare gains of reducing the current in°ation target further. Also, if there are
additional costs of reducing in°ation not captured by the model, there might be no gains of
reducing the current in°ation target.
By focusing on the steady state analysis, we cannot capture the full welfare e®ect of
adjusting in°ation rates. To be able to properly measure the potential gain/loss of changing
in°ation targets one needs to take into consideration the transitional e®ects and to explicitly
solve for the short-run dynamics out of steady state. This interesting but challenging task
will be delegated to future research.
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